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BOOK REVIEW 
 
Common and Uncommon Families 
and the American Constitutional 
Order 
Linda C. McClain* 
STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
  
Mark E. Brandon. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2014. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: A FAMILIAR STORY ABOUT FAMILIES AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
In his aptly named book, States of Union: Family and Change 
in the American Constitutional Order, Professor Mark E. Brandon 
WDFNOHV D IDPLOLDU ´VWRU\µ DERXW IDPLO\ values and the American 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO RUGHU 7KH VWRU\ JRHV OLNH WKLV ´[A]cross the ages, a 
particular familial form has held³monogamous, heterosexual, 
 
 * Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434039 
20 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC [Vol. 67:19 
permanent, and reproductive. This family is natural and has helped 
establish and maintain a kind of ciYLOL]DWLRQ LQFOXGLQJRXURZQµ1 In 
this story, ´[l]aw, economy, and culture therefore have historically 
recognized [this family·s] fundamentality,µ but ´beginning in the 
1960s, law altered the landscape on which this family had 
traditionally flourished.µ2 Brandon offers as illustrative of this story 
Mary Ann Glendon·s assertion that, beginning in the 1960s, ´ ¶legal 
norms which had remained relatively undisturbed for centuries were 
discarded or radically altered in the areas of marriage, divorce, family 
support obligations, inheritance, the relation of parent and child, and 
the status of children born outside marriage.· µ3 Critics of this 
transformation view the Supreme Court as ´one culprit,µ since it 
constitutionalized family and marriage, for example, through its 
evolving doctrine of constitutional privacy.4 This ´jurisprudence of the 
family,µ critics contend, ´weakened the institution of the family by 
challenging the preconditions for sustaining its traditional forms and 
functions.µ5 Such alteration in the constitutional landscape, on this 
account, threatens to ´unravel the social fabric of the constitutional 
order.µ6 
To students of constitutional law and family law, as well as to 
observers of contemporary political debates and social movements, 
this ´storyµ will sound familiar. As I observed, in examining the place 
of families in the political and constitutional order: ´The ideas that a 
significant link exists between the state of families and the state of 
the nation, and that strong, healthy families undergird a strong 
nation, are animating a number of social movements as well as 
governmental efforts to strengthen families.µ7 So, too, those who 
advance rationales for ´defendingµ and ´protectingµ marriage against a 
new definition that would extend to same-­sex couples have appealed 
to the idea that the American constitutional and political order have 
rested upon a particular, unchanging form of family. Illustrative is the 
testimony that former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney gave 
during a congressional hearing on ´preserving marriageµ through a 
federal marriage amendment, held in 2004 just after same-­sex couples 
 
 1. MARK E. BRANDON, STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 2 (2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, 
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 1 (1989)). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2006). 
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began marrying in Massachusetts. Governor Romney referred to the 
family unit as underpinning ´all successful societiesµ and as ´the 
single most powerful force that preserves society across generations, 
through centuries.µ8 He then asked: ´Should we abandon marriage as 
we know it, and as it·s been known to the framers of our constitution? 
Has America been wrong about marriage for 200-­plus years?µ9 
II. BRANDON·S CONSTITUTIONAL STORY 
States of Union is a wry and engaging answer to these 
rhetorical claims about an unchanging form of family and marriage as 
well as the relationship between that form and our constitutional 
order. Brandon ´tests some of the claims of proponents of family 
valuesµ about the relationship between the family and the political 
and constitutional order, or³to conjure his title³between the state of 
the family and the state of the union.10 His title·s reference to ´states 
of unionµ previews his skepticism about the appeal to one, unchanging 
family form. Indeed, he explains that his book will ´offer discrete 
glimpses into American familial households across time,µ an historical 
examination that reveals that the ´history of family in the United 
States³and how it came to be in the Constitution³has been a story of 
change and contestation,µ11 rather than of a natural family 
undisturbed since the founding until the social and constitutional 
change beginning in the 1960s. These ´glimpsesµ are rich and 
illuminating. Brandon makes a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of the place of families in the constitutional order. 
Moreover, by focusing on distinct types of ´American familial 
householdsµ over time, the book valuably highlights the interplay of 
family pluralism, legal regulation, and constitutional development. 
In his focus on the ´American constitutional orderµ and on the 
relatively late date at which the U.S. Supreme Court ´read a form of 
family into the Constitution,µ12 Brandon·s book valuably complements 
the story told in Nancy Cott·s excellent and informative book, Public 
Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation.13 Cott·s thesis was: 
 
 8. Preserving Marriage: A View from the States: Hearing before the S. Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7 (2004) (statement of Mass. Gov. Mitt Romney) [hereinafter Romney 
Statement]. 
 9. Id.  
 10. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 7. 
 11. Id. at 7, 266. 
 12. Id. at 211 (emphasis added). 
 13. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000). I 
organized and contributed to a book reYLHZV\PSRVLXPIRU3URIHVVRU&RWW·VERRNLQWKHMRXUQDO
THE GOOD SOCIETY. Linda C. McClain, 7KH3ODFHRI0DUULDJHLQ'HPRFUDF\·V)RUPDWLYH3URMHFW, 
11:3 THE GOOD SOC·Y 50 (2002). 
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´From the founding of the United States to the present day, 
assumptions about the importance of marriage and its appropriate 
form have been deeply implanted in public policy, sprouting 
repeatedly as the nation took over the continent and established terms 
for the inclusions and exclusion of new citizens.µ14 Her book tells the 
story of how ´[p]olitical and legal authorities endorsed and aimed to 
perpetuate nationally a particular marriage model: lifelong, faithful 
monogamy, formed by the mutual consent of a man and a woman, 
bearing the impress of the Christian religion and the English common 
law in its expectations for the husband to be the family head and 
economic provider, his wife the dependent partner.µ15 The founders 
viewed this form of marriage, Cott explained, as ´especially congruent 
with American political ideals,µ including consent as the ´hallmarkµ of 
representative government.16 Cott·s book explicated the tensions 
between the role of monogamous marriage as a powerful political 
metaphor and the ´gender orderµ that marriage helped to shape, 
which included the common law model of the husband as the legal 
representative DQG´headµ of the household and the wife as losing her 
´civic presenceµ as she was ´absorbed into her husband·s legal and 
economic persona upon marrying.µ17 
States of Union, in contrast, emphasizes the relatively late 
entrenchment of the monogamous nuclear family in the constitutional 
order. Brandon reveals the complexity of the connections ´between law 
and family,µ and how these have been ´simultaneously sympathetic 
and antagonistic,µ depending not only on ´timingµ but also on ´the 
form of family that·s at issue.µ18 Cott·s ´archaeology of American 
monogamyµ begins with the founders· ´political theory of marriageµ 
and then elaborates on how, under this political theory, the new 
nation depended on monogamy19 and, at various points, ´[t]raditional 
monogamy appeared to need bolstering.µ20 The most notable example 
of such bolstering is the late nineteenth-­century federal campaign 
against the Mormons, memorably upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Reynolds v. United States (as I discuss below).21 Brandon similarly 
 
 14. COTT, supra note 13, at 2. 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 3, 7. 
 18. Id. at 7. 
 19. Id. DW QRWLQJ LQD FKDSWHUHQWLWOHG ´$Q$UFKDHRORJ\RI$PHULFDQ0RQRJDP\µ WKDW
´WKH)RXQGHUVKDGDSROLWLFDOWKHRU\RIPDUULDJHµDV&KULVWLDQPRQRJDP\ 
 20. Id. at 105. 
 21. Id. at 105;; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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begins with the ´English ancestryµ of ´the American law of family.µ22 
He, by contrast, emphasizes a perhaps surprising degree of pluralism 
in forms of American households and, in his account, Reynolds and 
similar cases indicate the relatively late entrenchment of Christian 
monogamous marriage in the constitutional order. His book aims to 
show reasons for skepticism of the claim that an unchanging family 
form, and attendant family values, undergird the constitutional order. 
His story, then, is of the coexistence of different forms of households in 
America even before the founding, the different types of virtues and 
values generated in those households, and finally, the different 
regulatory approaches taken toward those families. 
 Brandon also reminds contemporary readers that, for the 
founders and the framers, ´familyµ did not always have positive and 
glowing connotations either as the seedbed of civic virtue or the 
indispensable foundation for good morals. To the contrary, they 
viewed certain types of families as problematic and sought to avoid 
them: they rejected Britain·s institution of the hereditary monarchy, 
and they also abolished certain feudal doctrines that permitted family 
dynasties and the concentration of wealth and power within families 
by restricting the alienation of land.23 Thus, Brandon explains: ´When 
the Constitution appeared on the scene, neither it nor its proponents 
said much about family, other than to worry about potential problems 
of familial self-­dealing within government and the need to inhibit the 
rise of familial dynasties.µ24 
While the Constitution did not say much about the family, 
Brandon does grant that ´assumptions about the forms and functions 
of families were in the background.µ25 He asserts that ´no single type 
of family provided an exclusive form for nor fit with the polity,µ 
explaining that distinct family types connoted distinct virtues and 
values: 
In fact, there were three prominent types for which one might have found support. One, 
the Jeffersonian model, was an agrarian family of independent farmers residing on land 
that was owned fee simple, free from bondage to lords, and congenial to the organic 
localist production of democratic virtue. The second, Hamiltonian, model was linked to 
commercial capitalist modes of production and to nationalist, liberal, and individualist 
virtues. The third was the slaveholding family, apology for which could be traced to the 
Bible, to sociology, and to a form of Aristotelian natural law. It was not strictly nuclear 
in form, nor consistently monogamous in practice.26 
 
 22. BRANDON, supra QRWHDW HQWLWOLQJFKDSWHU ´(QJOLVK$QFHVWU\RI WKH$PHULFDQ
/DZRI)DPLO\µ 
 23. Id. at 69²79. 
 24. Id. at 263. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 263²64. 
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Brandon then offers what may be the most provocative claim in 
his book: the slaveholding family ´came closest to enjoying explicit 
constitutional sanction,µ27 or, as he puts it elsewhere in the book, ´the 
Constitution acknowledged and even entrenched one particular form 
of family: the slaveholding household.µ28 Pointing out that ´slavery 
didn·t square neatly with republican values,µ he stresses that it was 
nonetheless ´legally protected and, for decades after the constitutional 
founding, slaveholding households were present in every region in the 
country.µ29 Eventually, the ´intense political debateµ over slavery 
would play a role in the ´breakdown of the constitutional order,µ and 
the failed attempt at a ´second secession[]µ by southern states.30 
Brandon·s book illuminates how part of the conflict over slavery 
included conflict over what place, if any, slaveholding households 
would have on the frontier, where there was a fourth family type, ´the 
frontier family.µ This category might more accurately be called 
frontier ´families,µ since there were ´several versions of the family on 
the frontier, linked to distinct modes of production, from farming, to 
ranching, to mining, to bourgeois trades and occupations that grew in 
or around settlements that dotted the West.µ31 These families, he 
argues, ´tended to strongly exhibit the colonial characteristics of 
negotiated roles, equality (especially of gender), and exit.µ32 Indeed, by 
necessity, frontier families manifested those characteristics even more 
strongly than their eastern counterparts. Brandon explains that, 
while American law ´retained elements of English law,µ including its 
´disabling [for wives] doctrine of coverture,µ for families on the 
frontier, harsh conditions challenged the ´eastern template for family 
rolesµ and ´impelled departures from convention,µ with husbands and 
wives taking on, respectively, feminine and masculine tasks and 
shifting expectations within marriage.33 Brandon explains that ´[f]or 
many years after the constitutional founding, the nation did not 
decisively take sides in the competition between slaveholding families 
and white nuclear families on the frontier.µ34 
 
       27.   Id. at 264. 
 28. Id. at 9. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 81. 
 31. Id. at 264. 
 32. Id. Brandon here draws on the Carl Degler·VDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHWhree characteristics 
RI WKH ´¶modern American family·µ WKDW ´¶HPHUJHG ILUVW LQ WKH \HDUV EHWZHHQ WKH $PHULFDQ
Revolution DQG DERXW ·µ Id. at 114 (citing CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE 
FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 8²15 (1980)). 
 33. Id. at 114, 126. 
 34. Id. at 11. 
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Brandon·s claim about slaveholding families is perhaps his 
most provocative because such a claim poses an uncomfortable 
challenge to arguments that at the ´time of the founding of the 
Constitution, it was widely believed that a certain form of 
organization of family (the marriage-­based family) was essential to 
cultivate civic virtue,µZKLFKLV ´an indispensable prerequisite for any 
republican . . . government.µ35 That family, on this view, ´was the 
substructure upon which the superstructure of the Constitution was 
erected.µ36 Proponents of such a view, for example, tend to omit 
slaveholding families from their analysis and contend that the ´racial 
familyµ supported by political leaders and policed by anti-­
miscegenation laws in post-­Civil War America37 was a corruption or 
´captureµ of marriage to promote racist ideologies.38 By contrast, 
Brandon points out that even an ´antislavery politicianµ like Abraham 
Lincoln held ´racialist views of home and family,µ and argued that the 
territories on the frontier should be reserved for ´free white laborers, 
who want the land to bring up their families upon,µ thus avoiding 
racial mixing.39 
III. UNCOMMON FAMILIES 
States of Union also offers glimpses of some ´uncommon 
families,µ unconventional households that deviated from the nuclear 
model of family, and examines the distinct ways that ´legal and 
political institutions tended to deal with each form.µ40 Brandon calls 
these families ´uncommonµ not because they were rare, but because 
they ´departed from the legal template that the common law (broadly 
conceived) presumed to impose.µ41 Indeed, Brandon finds it 
noteworthy ´that these experiments were as frequent as they were.µ42 
He also draws attention to how the experiments played out in 
different regions of the United States: the ´seedbed for 
experimentation was New England, [and] the expanding western 
frontier became a place for transplantation,µ while ´southern soil 
 
 35. Lynn D. Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy, 
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 350 (2003).  
 36. Id.  
 37. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 80, 101. 
 38. See Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the 
´/RYLQJ$QDORJ\µIRU6DPH-­Sex Marriage, 51 Howard L. J. 117 (2008). 
 39. BRANDON, supra note 1, at %UDQGRQDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDW/LQFROQ·V´SRVLWLRQRQUDFH
ZDVQRWVWDWLFµDQGWKDW´KHZRXOGJUDYLWDWHWRPRUHOLEHUDOYLHZVEHIRUHKLVDVVDVVLQDWLRQµId. 
 40. Id. at 264. 
 41. Id. at 151. 
 42. Id. 
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tended to be inhospitable to these experiments.µ43 The institutional 
response to these ´uncommon familiesµ entailed ´the gradual 
nationalization and constitutionalization of the morality of family,µ44 
culminating (as I discuss below) in the Supreme Court·s various anti-­
polygamy decisions. 
This review cannot do justice to the rich sketches Brandon 
offers of a sampling of these ´uncommon families.µ Some elaboration 
will afford the reader a sense of how these groups perceived family 
and marriage and how the society around these groups perceived 
them, sometimes precipitating legal and political responses. By 
focusing primarily on groups whose communal families found their 
roots in religious inspiration or teaching, Brandon makes the 
instructive point that, ´far from being a source of social stability, 
religion was the engine for radical experimentation in the forms, 
functions, and values of family.µ45 Indeed, to pick up on the ´seedbedµ 
imagery Brandon introduces, these uncommon families inspired by 
religion seem to unsettle the conventional expectation³often traced 
back to the founding³that both religion and the family would be 
seedbeds of virtue undergirding America·s ´experiment in ordered 
liberty.µ46 Through freedom of conscience and belief, then, ´[l]aw 
provided a space in which a group·s associations and productive 
enterprises might flourish.µ47 By the same token, perceived affronts to 
sexual morality were a limiting condition on the degree of tolerance 
for such experiments. 
Brandon begins with communal families prior to nationhood, 
which were ´ascetic, pietist, millenarian, and Protestant.µ48 While 
some of these groups permitted marriage, they extolled celibacy as 
they ´prepar[ed] for Christ·s second coming and for their own spiritual 
rebirth in the kingdom of heaven,µ finding doctrinal support in the 
writings of the Apostle Paul.49 Some forms of communal life, such as a 
pietist group initially called ´the Solitaryµ and renamed (as it grew) 
´The Community at Ephrata,µ included segregating men and women, 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 180. 
 46.  MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE ´WKHUHLVPXFKHYLGHQFHWKDW>WKH)RXQGHUV@FRXQWHGRQIDPLOLHVFXVWRP
religion, and convention to preserve and promote the virtues required by our experiment in 
RUGHUHG OLEHUW\µ 0F&ODLQ VXSUD QRWH 7 DW  H[SODLQLQJ WKH ´FLYLO VRFLHW\ SURSRVLWLRQµ
advanced by Glendon and others that the founders assumed that institutions of civil society³
including the family and religion³would be seedbeds of civic virtue). 
 47. BRANDON, supra note 1, at 180. 
 48. Id. at 152. 
 49. Id. 
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who both lived in celibacy (thus ´suppressing erosµ).50 Interestingly, 
married people joined this group, which repudiated marriage and 
attributed ´the marriage stateµ to ´the fall of man.µ51 The group·s 
communism (the sharing of property) did not trigger reaction by public 
authorities, but instead conflict arose when the group resisted paying 
a ´single men·s tax,µ contending that they were a ´spiritual familyµ 
and should not be put in the same class as ´rogues and vagabonds.µ52 
They were willing, however, to ´pay of their earthly possessions what 
was just.µ53 The judge accepted the bargain, thus, Brandon quips, 
´making Ephrata the first officially recognized same-­sex family in 
North America.µ54 
This group also came into conflict with civil authorities in 1744 
when the leaders, the Eckerlin brothers, constructed a building where 
civilly married husbands and wives could give each other ´letters of 
divorceµ in order to pursue ´spiritual celibate livesµ by entering, 
respectively, the Brotherhood of Zion and the Roses of Saron.55 
Following a civil investigation into these ´extra-­legal divorces,µ 
Beissel, the founder, ´recanted and ordered the couples to return to 
their previously married lives.µ56 Brandon observes: ´Even on the 
fringe of European settlement, the civil authority was jealous of its 
control of marriage and divorce.µ57 Otherwise, the Brotherhood 
engaged in many economic pursuits, with a ´diverse portfolio of 
industrial venturesµ that brought ´an impressive level of material 
prosperity.µ58 
This emphasis on material prosperity is also relevant to 
Brandon·s recounting of the Shakers, a communal group led by a 
woman, Ann Lee. The group was ´forming in the wilderness of upstate 
New Yorkµ just as Ephrata was dissolving.59 Lee migrated from 
England to New York in 1774, just before the Revolution. Renouncing 
´lustful gratifications of the fleshµ and ´distancing herself from her 
marriage both psychically and physically,µ Lee, or ´Mother Ann,µ 
 
 50. Id. at 155. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 156. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. %UDQGRQ OLQNV WKH ´VLQJOHPHQ·V WD[µ WR 4XHHQ (OL]DEHWK·V DWWHPSW GLVFXVVHG LQ
Chapter 2 of his book, in sixteenth FHQWXU\(QJODQG´WRLGHQWLI\DQGFRQWURO¶PDVWHUOHVVPHQ·µ 
Id.;; see id. at 51 (explaining that, in 1579 ´4XHHQ (OL]DEHWK LVVXHG D SURFODPDWLRQ DJDLQVW
¶5RJXHV DQG9DJDERQGV DQG DOO ,GOH >DQG9DJUDQW@ SHUVRQV DQG0DVWHUOHVVHPHQ KDYing not 
wherewith to live . . . E\DQ\ODZIXO/DERXURU2FFXSDWLRQ·µ 
 55. Id. at 156. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 156²57. 
 59. Id. at 157. 
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preached that the Shakers ´had already risen with Christ, but the cost 
of resurrection was to ¶forsake the marriage of the flesh.· µ60 The group 
survived the death of its charismatic leader in 1784. Its theology 
embraced the equality of men and women in their ´rational faculties 
and governing powerµ as a basic biblical tenet and viewed God as a 
duality, including ´the likeness of male and femaleµ rather than a 
Trinity.61 The Shaker community, moreover, would be a new spiritual 
family, a ´marriageless family,µ for Shakers insisted that 
´disorganizing [nuclear] families, and dissolving the ties of natureµ 
were necessary to attain the ´gospel relationµ required of Christ·s 
kingdom on earth.62 Brandon points out that the Shakers on the one 
hand recognized monogamous marriage as a ´civil right and a civil 
institution,µ but on the other as ´not an institution with a connection 
to Christianity, properly understood.µ63 Thus, Mary Dyer, who 
originally joined with her husband and their five children but 
subsequently left, wrote and spoke against the Shakers as destroying 
the family.64 Brandon notes that she unsuccessfully petitioned the 
New Hampshire legislature for a custody order for her children, but 
later obtained a divorce when the legislature passed a law providing 
as a ground for divorce that a ´spouse [had] joined and stayed for at 
least three years with a sect that professed that ¶the relation between 
husband and wife [is] unlawful.· µ65 In granting the divorce, the court 
observed that Mary·s husband, Joseph, by failing to cohabit with her, 
´had failed in a duty that was ¶the great end of matrimony, the 
continuation of the species.· µ66 
Notwithstanding the Shakers· unconventional views about 
marriage and their uncommon family form, Brandon reports that, by 
the mid-­nineteenth century, ´most Americans . . . extended to the 
Shakers a sincere if sometimes grudging respect for the way of life 
they produced.µ67 In words evocative of Chief Justice Burger·s opinion 
in Wisconsin v. Yoder (speaking of the Amish community), Brandon 
continues: ´If they were odd, they were productive, honest, and 
essentially harmless.µ68 Some observers, such as Friedrich Engels, 
went beyond grudging respect to outright praise for a group that 
seemed capable of forming a well-­ordered society without marriage, 
 
 60. Id. at 159. 
 61. Id. at 160. 
 62. Id. at 161. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 164²65.  
 65. Id. at 165. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 167. 
 68. Id.;; cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
2014] COMMON AND UNCOMMON FAMILIES 29 
´bourgeoisµ property, and without ´the laws of the land.µ69 Courts also, 
Brandon observes, showed a ´surprising level of toleranceµ toward the 
Shakers;; to illustrate, he notes the willingness of the Michigan 
Supreme Court to define ´family,µ for purposes of an insurance policy, 
as including ´any group constituting a distinct or social body,µ and 
even ´whole sects, as in the case of the Shakers.µ70 
As a contrasting example of a communal family that 
´repudiated marriage and committed itself to sustained economic self-­
sufficiency,µ Brandon discusses the Oneida community, which 
´publicly parted company with the Shakers on the matter of sex.µ71 
Instead of repudiating sexuality and ´the flesh,µ the Oneida 
community founder, John Humphrey Noyes, articulated a vision of 
channelling sexuality that included ´complex marriageµ (or non-­
monogamy), male continence (refraining from ejaculating during or 
after sex unless pregnancy was intended), and also the social control 
of reproduction by ´stirpicultureµ (or ´the cultivation of the raceµ).72 
Like the Shakers, the Oneida community espoused the equality of 
men and women. These unconventional sexual beliefs and practices 
brought the Oneida into conflict with civil authorities and religious 
leaders at various points, Brandon chronicles, particularly with New 
York Congressman Anthony Comstock. Comstock was responsible for 
the Comstock Law, which criminalized the mailing of ´ ¶obscene, lewd, 
and/or lascivious material,· including information about contraception 
or abortion.µ73 Not only did that law bar a sizable segment of the 
Society·s tracts, but ´[p]ro-­Comstock forces . . . adopted resolutions 
condemning the community as a ¶pernicious institution which rests 
substantially on a system of organized fanaticism and lust,· µ and a 
major convention of churches urged an investigation of the 
community.74 Up until this point, the Oneida community had enjoyed 
´stunning prosperityµ in its original and five additional locations and 
had weathered various storms brought on by investigations into their 
rumored sexual practices. Noyes proposed abandoning complex 
marriage and holding onto economic communism to address the 
group·s unpopularity;; although his proposal was ratified, the 
community itself dissolved just a few years later, leaving only a 
holding company.75 
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Brandon sums up his analysis of these uncommon families by 
noting that Aristotle recognized two ´naturalµ and constitutive 
functions of the household: production and reproduction.76 Although 
these communities ´might be intensely committed to a religious idea,µ 
what allowed them to flourish in the long term was ´a practical 
commitment to material sustenance and well-­being.µ77 Remarkably, 
the Shakers ´sustained their communities for generations,µ as new 
members joined, even though they foreswore ´the sexual means 
through which reproduction takes place.µ78 The Oneidas, also a highly 
productive community, ´were badgered into abandoning their familial 
experimentµ because of the concern of their opponents over, as 
Brandon puts it, ´who was having sex with whom, and to what end.µ79 
IV. THE BATTLE AGAINST MORMONISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENTRENCHMENT OF THE MONOGAMOUS FAMILY 
States of Union then turns to the Mormons, ´uncommon 
familiesµ with a particularly significant place in ´the story of the 
relation between families and the American constitutional order.µ80 As 
he notes, the story of the rise of Mormonism in the United States, the 
westward migration of the Mormons, and the federal government·s 
campaign against polygamy and the theocracy of the Utah territory 
has been told many times.81 So too has the denouement of the Church 
of Latter Day Saints· revelation that it should discontinue the practice 
of plural marriage and Utah·s admission to the Union, with a 
provision in Utah·s constitution guaranteeing ´perfect toleration of 
religious sentiment,µ while forever banning the practice of 
´polygamous and plural marriages.µ82 Constitutional law and family 
law casebooks excerpt Reynolds v. United States,83 perhaps the best 
known of the U.S. Supreme Court·s many decisions involving the 
Mormons. Brandon·s central point in this part of his book is that ´[t]he 
resolution of the Mormon Question completed a process through which 
the monogamous family was both nationalized and 
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constitutionalized.µ84 That process, which he describes in an earlier 
chapter, ´had begun much earlier in the nineteenth centuryµ against 
native tribes, whose family forms did not conform to ´the common-­law 
template.µ85 Brandon points out that, in both cases, Congress 
perceived a threat to the political order from a way of life incompatible 
with Christian civilization. Political rhetoric spoke of the 
incompatibility of ´savage and civilized life,µ86 and of the need to ´kill 
the Indianµ in Indians so they could assimilate.87 Federal efforts 
(always disturbing to read) included compelling Indian children to 
assimilate through attending off-­the-­reservation schools, shoring up 
the ´manhoodµ and the work ethic of Indian men by dividing 
reservation land into lots, and suppressing polygamy.88 
 With respect to the Mormon practice of polygamy, the trope 
was that polygamy was tantamount to barbarism and incompatible 
with Christian civilization. Thus, the Reynolds Court claimed that 
polygamy ´has always been odious among the northern and western 
nations of Europeµ and, prior to the Mormons, was ´almost exclusively 
a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.µ89 The Court 
famously linked polygamy to ´stationary despotismµ and monogamy to 
republicanism. Brandon points out the ´several items of irony and 
interestµ in Reynolds: 
2QHLQYROYHGWKH&RXUW·V LQYRFDWLRQRI WKHVDFUHGWR OLPLWUHOLJLRXVO\PRWLYDWHGDFWLRQ
$QRWKHUZDVWKH&RXUW·VRGGO\LQFRPSOHWHDFFRXQWRISROLWLFDOKLVWRU\ZKLFKLJQRUHGQRW
only monogamous despotisms but also the long history of concubinage among the royalty 
DQG DULVWRFUDF\ HYHQ RI QRUWKHUQ DQG ZHVWHUQ (XURSH 6WLOO DQRWKHU ZDV WKH &RXUW·V
hand wringing over patriarchy, essentially declaring it be an un-­American, despite the 
fact that the United States practiced its own republican version of patriarchy. In fact, 
Mormon Utah was one of the few places in the United States where women could vote. 
7R EH VXUH WKHUH ZHUH OLPLWV WR ZRPHQ·V IUHHGRP LQ H[HUFLVLQJ WKDW ULJKW >WR YRWH@
supervised as they were by husbands and church fathers. But they did possess the 
formal right³for a time, at least.90 
The Supreme Court, Brandon details, upheld other federal 
enactments directed at polygamy, such as the Edmunds Act, which 
disenfranchised bigamists, polygamists, and cohabitors, and barred 
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them from jury service and from holding any appointed or elected 
office in the territory. Once again, the Court stressed the vital 
relationship between the form of the family and the ´founding of a 
free, self-­governing commonwealth,µ praising the family ´springing 
from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of 
matrimony,µ as ´the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in 
our civilization.µ91 Brandon details a litany of further Congressional 
acts directed against the territory of Utah and against polygamy. In 
Davis v. Beason, the Court rejected a claim that polygamy was 
protected by the free exercise of religion and countered that ´[b]igamy 
and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian 
countries. . . . They tend to destroy the purity of the marital relation, 
to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman, and to debase 
man.µ92 Brandon points out that, writing in 1890, the Court probably 
had the Oneida community in mind when it warned of the 
consequences of allowing the free exercise of religion to include 
religiously motivated conduct: ´[T]here have been sects which denied 
as part of their religious tenets that there should be any marriage tie, 
and advocated promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, as prompted by 
the passions of its members.µ93 Brandon points out, again, the irony of 
the Court rejecting a free exercise claim by taking a position that 
resembled an establishment;; that is, that ´the general consent of the 
Christian worldµ is that the punitive power of government may be 
used against ´crimesµ that ´the tenets of a religious sectµ encourage.94 
Just a few months later, Brandon notes, the Court upheld the 
authority of Congress to ´repeal the charter of the Mormon Church 
and seize the church·s propertyµ and, in so doing, referred to the 
church·s ´nefarious doctrineµ of polygamy and polygamy·s spread as ´a 
return to barbarism . . . contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of 
the civilization which Christianity has produced in the western 
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world.µ95 Several months later, the president of the church announced 
a revelation that the Church should discontinue practicing polygamy. 
Eventually, Congress released the Church·s assets, ´justifying the 
release on the ground that the church had ceased practicing and 
advocating polygamy,µ96 and President Cleveland signed the Enabling 
Act allowing the People of Utah to ratify a constitution and join the 
U.S. as a state, on equal footing with the original states.97 
The polygamy cases, Brandon argues, exemplify one prominent 
theme in the Court·s ´familial jurisprudenceµ: ´[T]he importance of 
family in promoting and preserving a kind of moral order.µ98 To 
reiterate his book·s claim, they are also significant as marking the 
time ´when the Supreme Court bestowed its blessing on the national 
policyµ of committing publicly to ´the monogamous nuclear familyµ in 
the name of ´preserving civilization and progress.µ99 Brandon 
insightfully adds that, although the Court insisted that ´the nuclear 
family promoted two abstract values central to the American order: 
liberty and equality,µ that commitment, arguably, was ´more 
rhetorical than real,µ given the persistence of ´restrictive family 
policiesµ and lingering of ´gender hierarchyµ well into the twentieth 
century.100 
V. MODERN DEBATES ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILIES 
When it turns to ´modern times,µ States of Union adeptly 
identifies certain tensions within the Court·s jurisprudence about the 
continuing relevance of family to present debates.101 One benefit of 
Brandon·s book is that his focus on the family in the constitutional 
order brings into relief certain features of that jurisprudence that are 
not as evident when encountering it, casebook style, in particular 
contexts. 
Perhaps the most striking tension concerns the Court·s 
approach to governmental regulation of the family, which relates in 
turn to tension over whether to trust families as vital sources of 
social³and literal³reproduction or distrust them as units that may 
undermine the political and constitutional order. As the polygamy 
cases vividly illustrate, the Court has upheld federal governmental 
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efforts to prohibit family forms deemed inimical to good political order 
and republican values (and, as well, to Christianity). As his discussion 
of federal measures against the native tribes suggests, the federal 
government perceived that forcing assimilation of Indians into nuclear 
family forms and instilling proper ´valuesµ in their children was 
necessary for Indians to continue to exist amidst a Christian 
civilization. The founders and framers sought to prevent certain types 
of families they viewed as incompatible with American liberty, that is, 
feudal and dynastic families and hereditary, monarchical families. 
Slaveholding households, Brandon points out, came closest to enjoying 
constitutional sanction and yet, over time, the political and 
constitutional conflict over slavery led to civil war. Opponents of 
slavery compared it to barbarism, as bad as or worse than polygamy. 
Brandon also puts in context the Court·s upholding of 
compulsory sterilization in Buck v. Bell, which illustrates a 
willingness to regulate and even restrict family formation on a view 
that certain families will harm or weaken society. Shocking enough as 
Justice Holmes·s language in Buck v. Bell (1927) still is, it is even 
more shocking to read it separated by just a few pages in Brandon·s 
book (and by a few Supreme Court terms) from the Court·s famous 
anti-­totalitarian rhetoric in defense of liberty (in parental and other 
forms) in Meyer v. Nebraska, decided in 1923, and in Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, following in 1925.102 Meyer and Pierce feature in 
contemporary jurisprudence and constitutional argument in support of 
noninterference with the ´private realm of the familyµ (articulated in 
Prince v. Massachusetts103 in 1944) and in favor of allowing families to 
carry out their important tasks of social reproduction. As Brandon 
details, Skinner, decided in 1942, articulated the basic right ´to have 
offspring,µ linking it to the right to marry and warning of the ´far-­
reaching and devastating effectsµ of exercising ´the power to 
sterilize.µ104 
 The tension between the Court·s recognition both that there is 
a ´private realmµ of family life and that the family is not immune from 
regulation continues to the present day. James Fleming and I have 
described this as a ´two-­stepµ in the Court·s  jurisprudence about the 
regulation of the family, marriage, and parents: ´[F]ollowing quick on 
the heels of step one³a declaration that something is ¶fundamental· 
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and ¶private·³is step two³a clarification that it is neither absolute 
nor beyond regulation.µ105 
Brandon illustrates how the emerging jurisprudence of 
individual privacy limited states· ability to enforce particular family or 
moral values through law. Complicating the story is the emergence of 
sex equality in the Court·s Equal Protection jurisprudence, so that the 
status quo in gender relations within the family upheld by the Court 
in Bradwell v. Illinois (1873)106 and well into the twentieth century 
became unconstitutional as the Court took a closer look at sex-­based 
classifications.107 If nothing else, claims about an unchanging and 
universally understood meaning of family or marriage stumble in 
confronting the contrast between the Court·s upholding of sex-­
differentiated roles for husband and wife into the 1960s and the 
Court·s repudiation of archaic stereotypes about DZRPDQ·V place in 
the home in subsequent decades. The Court·s evolving Equal 
Protection jurisprudence, from upholding anti-­miscegenation laws to 
striking them down as embodying white supremacy, also undercuts 
appeals to a timeless form of family recognizable to the founders and 
yet threatened by more modern conceptions. In other words, the 
intertwined evolution of the law of marriage and of Equal Protection 
jurisprudence about gender and the status of women offers a powerful 
rejoinder to questions like that posed by former Governor Romney at 
WKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKLVHVVD\´6KRXld we abandon marriage as we know 
LW DQG DV LW·V EHHQ NQRZQ WR WKH IUDPHUV RI RXU FRQVWLWXWLRQ" Has 
America been wrong about marriage for 200-­plus years"µ108 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Appropriately, States of Union concludes with an epilogue on 
United States v. Windsor, in which the Court struck down Section 3 of 
the Defense of Marriage Act ´'20$µ.109 DOMA itself illustrates that 
strand of thought that Congress must act to preserve traditional 
(Judeo-­Christian) marriage from threatening forms of family³in this 
case, marriage by two men or two women. In his dissent, Justice Alito 
contended that Edith Windsor sought to have the Court ´resolve a 
debate between two competing views of marriage,µ the ´traditionalµ or 
´conjugalµ view and the ´consent-­basedµ vision of marriage.110  
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Brandon argues that Justice Alito·s dissent relies upon the erroneous 
view of marriage as fixed and³until recently³unchanged. Although 
Justice Alito stated that the Constitution ´does not codify either of 
these views of marriage,µ he also ´asserted that an original 
understanding of the Constitution would likely support the traditional 
view,µ111 which is of marriage ´as an exclusively opposite-­sex 
institution and as one inextricably linked to procreation and biological 
kinship.µ112  Brandon points out several problems with Alito·s position 
in Windsor, among them, ´his reduction of views of marriage into two 
general types,µ when, ´[i]n fact, there is, and has long been in the 
United States, a wide range of views of the point and purpose of 
marriage, perhaps as many views as there have been marriages.µ113 In 
addition, while Alito characterizes the consent-­based view of marriage, 
´a vision that primarily defines marriage as the solemnization of 
mutual commitment³marked by strong emotional attachment and 
sexual attraction,µ as ´very prominentµ in ´popular understandingµ 
and ´popular culture,µ114 Brandon points out that certain Supreme 
Court precedents (such as Turner v. Safley115) ´positively embrace a 
companionate view of marriage.µ116 Another component of Justice 
Alito·s argument is his assertion that ´the family is an ancient and 
universal human institutionµ and that ´family structure reflects the 
characteristics of a civilization, and changes in family structure and in 
the popular understanding of marriage and the family can have 
profound effects.µ117 Although Brandon does not discuss this part of 
the opinion, it too reflects a static view of family that Brandon·s book 
challenges. Consider, for example, the radical difference in the 
prescribed and hierarchical gender roles of husband and wife in 
English common law, adopted by the colonies and U.S. courts and 
affirmed in earlier Supreme Court opinions, and the modern template 
of marriage as an equal partnership. The joint opinion in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey118 noted the shift from an earlier view of the 
Constitution, of women, and of the family, which gave husbands 
authority over their wives, to the contemporary constitutional 
understanding of women, the family, and marriage.119 
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Brandon·s concluding section on ´American Constitutional 
Familiesµ usefully pulls together the central messages of his book.120 
He observes: ´[T]he history of family in the United States³and of how 
it came to be in the Constitution³has been a story of change and 
contestation. . . . There has always been a plurality of views about the 
point of and reasons for marriage.µ121 Monogamy, he acknowledges, 
comes close to a ´constitutional modelµ of family, an ´officially 
sanctioned institution,µ but even so, ´that has been contested, and its 
form and function have altered through the years.µ122 Other than that, 
he counsels, ´there is no constitutional ideal of marriage, nor of 
family,µ but simply ´constitutional parameters within which debates 
over marriage and family have played out.µ After all, America ´has 
always been a place for experiments and for diverse ways of life.µ123 
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